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Abstract 
This paper explores the dynamics of female employment decisions around childbearing using 
longitudinal data from the 2002 Chilean Social Protection Survey (Encuesta de Protección Social, 
EPS). The study evaluates how the birth of a child can affect the woman’s decision to work, in 
particular among women with strong attachment to the labor market. 
The results indicate that the hazard of leaving employment is high for women during the first year of 
their newborn child. The mother of a newborn child is twice as likely to leave employment. The 
effect of newborns on employment transitions is even greater among older generations and among 
voluntary quitters. Even one year after the birth of a child, women still face a high risk of leaving 
employment. A woman who is still working when her son reaches the age of one, still faces a 50% 
higher risk of leaving employment. Something is making these mothers reconsider whether they 
should remain at work, provided that they have been working during the child’s first year of age. This 
could be related to the existence of maternal benefits in Chile, where women have a 20-week (paid) 
maternity and they are allowed up to a year of paid parental leave if the child is sick. A woman might 
not have any incentives (or have the need) to leave work while she is using these benefits but might 
be tempted (or have) to do it once she has exhausted them. 
The introduction of individual effects and employment history variables reveal the persistence of two 
contrasting labor force patterns among women. As the actual labor experience increases, the 
probability of entering an inactivity period decreases. Additionally, the greater the number of years a 
woman remained inactive in the past, the greater is the probability of re-entering an inactivity period. 
In the voluntary transitions model, past inactivity periods have a smaller effect on the probability of 
leaving employment. This can be seen as a possible indication of an important penalization by the 
labor market, in terms of employment opportunities after prolonged periods of inactivity. 
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Within the last few decades, there have been a series of socio demographic changes, which 
have accelerated and intensified the demographic transition phases in the world. One of the 
most influential changes within these demographic dynamics has been the massive 
incorporation of women in the labor market. 
In Chile, during the period of 1986 – 2005, the female labor force participation increased 
considerably. In particular, the labor force participation has grown significantly among 
mothers of very young children. The changes, however, have not been strong enough for the 
country’s participation rate to be at par with those of the developed economies, and 
inclusively with those of many Latin American countries. In the Latin American context, 
when studying the female labor force participation, it is found that Chile exhibits a 
participation rate below that of the regional average. Countries such as Argentina, Columbia, 
Uruguay and Bolivia have achieved a greater insertion of women in the labor market. 
The cultural factor can certainly be playing a fundamental role when explaining the scarce 
labor force attachment of the woman in Chile. Contreras and Plaza (2004) find that male 
chauvinistic behavior has a negative and significant effect on the decision of participating in 
the labor market. Together, such cultural factors counteract, more than twice, the positive 
effect of the human capital variables. The empirical evidence, found in this paper, is 
consistent with the theoretical papers of Vendrik (2003) and Neubourg and Vendrik (1994) 
and with the empirical results found by Fernández et al. (2004), Antecol (2003), Antecol and 
Bedard (2002) and Chuang and Lee (2003). The cultural perception of the woman’s role in 
  2the family is clearly related to her fertility rate, which in turn conditions her decision to 
participate in the labor market. Additionally, the labor supply of low-income females might 
be particularly affected by the limited supply of (formal) childcare along with an excessive 
compression in the wage structure. 
In Chile, various studies find that there is a decreasing relationship between labor force 
participation and the number of children in the family, both the total number of children as 
well as those under the age of 5 years (Contreras et al., 1999; Mizala et al., 1999)
1. However, 
the results found do not necessarily indicate that the number of children negatively affects 
the female labor supply in Chile. The number of children in the family can also be associated 
with the family model adopted. Additionally, the models may contain omitted variables, 
which affect the decisions of fertility, as well as those of labor supply. Due to the correlation 
between the family structure variables and the error term in the participation equation, not 
only are the estimated coefficients of these variables biased, but so are the estimates of the 
labor supply parameters. 
In this paper, the dynamics of female labor force participation in Chile is explored using a 
longitudinal database, the Social Protection Survey (Encuesta de Protección Social, EPS). 
The primary objective is to evaluate how the birth of a child can affect the woman’s decision 
to work, including women strongly attached to the labor market. To capture the effects of 
cultural factors playing a role on the woman’s attachment to the labor market and the effect 
of other non-varying omitted variables, the model developed includes a time-invariant 
                                                           
1 According to the data from the 2003 CASEN Survey the participation rate of a woman, with no children, 
between the ages of 25 and 55 years (present in the household) is 67.7%, while that of a woman, with a child 
younger than 12 months, is 38.3%. 
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for the effect of the individual’s intrinsic (time varying) attachment to the labor market and 
ensure the consistent estimation of the effect of the family structure variables on the current 
employment status. 
The longitudinal database makes possible to evaluate the level of persistence of the woman’s 
decision to participate in the labor market. There are two opposing extremes considered 
within the female labor force: a group with a strong attachment to the labor market, and 
another group that participates in the labor market on a sporadic basis. According to the 2003 
CASEN Survey, 90% of the men and 80% of the women employed in 2003 were also 
employed in the year 2000. Furthermore, 90% of the women, who were inactive in 2003, 
were also inactive in the year 2000. The persistence of unemployment among women, 
however, is not so evident. There is an important discouragement effect, explaining why 
many of the housewives in 2003 were also unemployed in the year 2000. Hence, it is 
important to study the dynamics of the labor force participation using longitudinal data. 
The following section presents the empirical model to be estimated. Section 3 describes the 
data and examines the mobility patterns between the different employment statuses for both 
men and women. In particular, the labor force participation and the employment patterns for 
both sexes are compared using data from the 2002 EPS and the 2003 CASEN Survey. 
Section 4 analyzes the main results of the estimation and finally section 5 concludes. 
 
  42.  Determinants of the Labor Market Transitions to Inactivity 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of the woman’s decision to enter an 
inactivity period. In particular, the woman’s decision to quit working is modeled as a 
function of human capital variables (schooling), employment history variables, such as 
actual labor experience, years of employment at job, and history of unemployment and 
inactivity periods, and family structure variables, such as the number and age of the children. 
The 2002 Social Protection Survey is used to undertake the analysis. This survey contains 
information on complete and incomplete periods of employment, inactivity and 
unemployment for each individual interviewed. These individuals are questioned on all 
periods of unemployment, inactivity and employment held between 1980 and 2002, the year 
the survey was conducted. The sample for the survey is extracted from an entire dataset of all 
persons affiliated to the private and public pension systems. A “historic sample” is selected 
from all individuals affiliated to the system since 1981 and who in August 2001 were in one 
of the following conditions: (a) employed; (b) unemployed or out of the labor force; (c) 
pensioned; (d) dead. 
Hence, by design, the sample excludes individuals who have never contributed to any of the 
pension systems. This potentially biases the sample towards individuals with a stronger 
attachment to the formal sector of the labor market. This means that individuals who are 
continuously inactive or continuously employed in the informal sector are systematically 
excluded from the sample. While the sample, therefore, is not useful for exploring the 
determinants of the inactivity periods, it is useful for studying the female labor market 
  5transitions, who after being employed for a certain period decide to exit the labor market. 
Section 3 presents statistics describing the database and discusses its possible biases. 
The information on complete and incomplete periods of labor activity and on the type of 
labor market transition experienced by the individual makes it possible to model the entry to 
inactivity periods as (Klein and Moeschberger, 2003), 
(1)    ) ) ( exp( ) ( )) ( ; ( 0 β λ α t Z t t Z t h i i i i =
where  is the baseline hazard function,   is a vector of variables that can or cannot 
vary in time for worker i at time t, and 
) ( 0 t λ ) (t Zi
β  is a vector of parameters to be estimated. In the 
model, the dependent variable is an indicator variable that assumes the value 1 if the 
individual stops working and enters an inactivity period, and assumes the value 0 if the 
individual continues employed. A more restrictive indicator variable, assuming a value equal 
to 1 when the individual voluntarily goes from being employed to being inactive, is also 
defined. Therefore, the decision of leaving the job is not influenced by a layoff or by reasons 
unknown to the worker. Antel (1986; 1988), Moore et al. (1998) and McLaughlin (1990; 
1991), among others, find that it pays off to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary 
labor market movements, even when this information is self-reported.  
The model assumes that the probability of entering an inactivity period is a function of the 
continuous employment time t (that measures the attachment to the labor market and/or the 
acquisition of current labor experience), but it is also a function of the individual’s 
characteristics, and the employment and family histories included in Z. 
  6The likelihood function to be maximized depends on the assumptions made on the baseline 
function  . The baseline function can be assigned a parametric form or it can be left 
unspecified (non-parametric estimation). It is not a problem to have individuals with more 
than one event. The likelihood function of the complete employment history would consist of 
the sum of the likelihood functions of each event. Additionally, the model assumes an 
individual effect 
) ( 0 t λ
i α , which captures the particular tastes of an individual with respect to 
employment. An individual, with less attachment to the labor market than the average 
worker, would have  i α  greater than one, while an individual, with greater attachment to the 
labor market, would have  i α  less than one. A parametric model assuming the following 
baseline function is estimated. 




p pt t λ
If the parameter p is less than one, the hazard of entering an inactivity period is decreasing in 
the continuous employment time; while if it is greater than one, the hazard of entering an 
inactivity period is increasing in employment time.  
The variables of interest in this model are those related to family structure. Other control 
variables to be included in the model are: years of schooling, age and employment history 
variables, such as years of actual pre-labor experience, years of inactivity and of 
unemployment since 1980. In some cases, the model also considers polynomials of these 
same variables, in an effort to control for the non-linear effects of the variables. The set of 
family structure variables essentially consists of the history of childbirths. Particularly, it is 
interesting to determine how the birth of a child affects the woman’s decision to continue 
  7working in different cohorts of women. That is, how different women react to the arrival of a 
child in different generations. 
Two conditions adopted in the model will adequately identify the childbirth effect. One is the 
inclusion of a fixed effect, which potentially captures the effects of the cultural factors 
playing a role on the woman’s attachment to the labor market and the effect of other non-
varying omitted variables. The other is the inclusion of employment history variables (pre-
labor experience). As reported by Duleep and Sanders (1994), Dex et al. (1998) and 
Nakamura and Nakamura (1994; 1996), the use of pre-labor experience variables makes it 
possible to control for the individual’s intrinsic (time varying) attachment to the labor market 
and to consistently estimate the effect of the family structure variables on the current 
employment status. Furthermore, it is not necessary to have a long employment history. 
Having information on relatively recent labor experience is sufficient to consistently estimate 
the parameters of the dynamic labor supply model. 
One drawback of this dataset is that is not possible to control for marital status. In 2000, 50% 
of the children in Chile were born outside marriage. Of this 50%, it is estimated that half are 
brought up by one parent. These figures have increased dramatically in the past twenty years. 
If women in single-parent households are more urged to remain at work and if single-parent 




                                                           
2 It is not in my interest to identify whether the parents are legally married or not. I will refer to married women 
as women who have a partner or significant other living in the household. 
  8That is, in a model that does not control for marital status, the effects of children on the 
probability or risk of leaving employment in different cohorts of women might not be 
reflecting the differences in marital status, these being the fact that it is more common to find 
single parents among young cohorts than among the older cohorts and the fact that single 
parents are usually more urged remain employed regardless of the number and age of their 
children. 
Unfortunately, variables related to the spouses’ presence are not well defined in this dataset. 
The EPS contains a module on the marital history of the individuals interviewed, but only 
reports information on the year of marriage (or the year the couple began living together) and 
whether the individual became widowed or separated. It does not include information on the 
date of separation or the date of death of the partner. Therefore I will only observe complete 
marital status histories of women who have been continuously single or who have only had 
one couple and were are still together in 2002. With these restrictions, the marital status is 
unknown for a (potentially non-random) group of women. 
In the model without marital status (Model I) I know that a high and positive coefficient for 
the old cohorts may be driven by the fact that most women in these cohorts had children in 
wedlock. This implies that the effects of the arrival of a new child might be overstated. I 
could restrict the estimation to women who, if married, have been continuously married to 
the same person (Model II-M) or I could consider all women whose marital status is known 
at all times (Model II-T). If the mechanism that generates this missing information is 
independent of the process of becoming at risk of leaving employment, my estimates based 
on these restricted samples should be consistent, although not necessarily asymptotically 
  9efficient. Other options might be to estimate the model with the noisy marital status variable, 
assuming that a relationship does not end until the next relationship starts (Model III) or 
estimate the model with year effects (Model IV). The year effects would allow me to control 
for the trend of single-parent families.  
Finally, information on the individual’s history of income earnings is also not available. I 
will estimate a reduced form model in which the salary variable is approximated using 
human capital and employment history variables. 
 
3.  Data. Patterns of Female Labor Market Mobility 
The 2002 Social Protection Survey reports information on 17,246 individuals, of which 
7,611 are women
3. The different modules of the questionnaire record information on these 
individuals and their household members. In particular, information on the employment 
history of each individual is recorded. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the EPS sample methodology does not necessarily 
record the employment history of the individuals who were continuously inactive or   
continuously employed outside of the formal system. In principle, the EPS contains 
information on women who have a strong attachment to the labor market. The employment 
and participation rates of women in November 2002, as given by the EPS, are greater than 
those reported by the 2003 CASEN Survey, even after controlling by age (see Table 1). 
 
                                                           
3 The expanded sample includes 8,058,681 records, of which 3,629,519 are women. 
  10Table 1:  
Employment and Participation Rates, 2003 CASEN Survey versus 2002 EPS 
Age at 2002  Women  Men 

















          
20-29  52.4 73.5 42.8 58.9 77.3 90.4 67.0 77.1 
30-39  56.5 71.9 50.9 60.8 95.7 97.6 89.4 88.1 
40-49  55.7 75.4 50.4 64.5 95.9 96.5 91.0 88.5 
50-59  46.2 67.3 42.8 59.7 87.9 87.6 82.4 79.2 
    
Source: Prepared using the 2002 EPS and the 2003 CASEN Survey. 
 
Additionally, having self-reported and retrospective data generates doubt on the accuracy of 
the information contained in the survey. Preliminary studies conducted by the 
Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones
4 reveal that the density of the 
contributions reported by the EPS are similar to those obtained from their administrative 
records
5. Hence, this database is reliable for studying continuous employment periods. 
The self-reported employment history recorded in the EPS contains detailed information on 
the periods of activity (employment and unemployment) and inactivity of the individuals 
interviewed. With this information, it is possible to reconstruct the employment history of 
both men and women. There is no information on the salary level but there is retrospective 
information on the years of schooling. This information was also reconstructed and annexed 
to the employment histories. With the objective of studying and controlling for differences in 
generations, the sample is stratified into four generations or cohorts according to the age of 
the individual in the year 2002: 34 or less, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 or more. The sample is 
                                                           
4 This agency regulates the Administrators of Pension Funds. 
5 The SAPF has a data set with the provisional history of a sample of individuals affiliated to the system. 
  11restricted to the events initiated after the individual reaches the age of 15 and before he 
reaches the age of 65. 
Table 2 reports statistics on the duration of employment, unemployment and inactivity 
periods for both men and women considered in the sample. In general, it is observed that 
women have shorter median duration of employment periods (with the same employer) than 
men. More importantly, it is noted that women also have shorter median duration of 
continuous employment periods. Women clearly hold shorter periods of continuous 
employment than their male counterparts. Furthermore, it is seen that the continuous periods 
of inactivity and unemployment are substantially longer for women than for men. In fact, the 
statistics on the duration of inactivity periods reflected in this table are downward biased, 
since the sample does not contain continuously inactive individuals. 
 
Table 2:  
Distribution of the Duration of Employment, Unemployment and Inactivity Periods 
In Months 
Male Female Total 
Duration of Employment Periods 
Same Employer 
   
Percentile 25  11  6  8 
Median  35 27 33 
Percentile 75  113  89  104 
Duration of Continuous Employment Periods       
Percentile  25  20 7 11 
Median 140  46  79 
Percentile 75  275 *  202  275 
Duration of Inactivity Periods       
Percentile25  11 13 11 
Median  35 47 38 
Percentile 75  71  126  99 
Duration of Unemployment Periods       
Percentile  25  2 3 2 
Median  5 7 6 
Percentile  75  12 21 14 
Source: Prepared using the 2002 EPS. 
  12Table 3 presents basic mobility statistics between the employment statuses for men and 
women. The second column illustrates the proportion of continuous periods of employment, 
unemployment and inactivity, which continued to be in effect until the end of the sample 
period (censored observations). The third to fifth columns show the proportion of continuous 
periods of employment, inactivity, and unemployment that terminate in periods of 
unemployment, employment, and inactivity, respectively. For women, it is observed that 
55% of the continuous employment events end in inactivity periods, while 92% of the 
inactivity periods end in employment periods. The table further indicates that women are 
more inclined to retire from the labor market than their male colleagues. There is a greater 
probability for the employment periods held by men to terminate in unemployment periods. 
 
Table 3:  
Persistence in the Employment Status by Sex 
% Events Terminate in Periods of  Type of Event  % Events 
Continuing in 2002 Unemployment Employment Inactivity 
Men  
Unemployment 15.0    98.1  1.8 
Employment 53.6  77.6    22.4 
Inactivity 17.7  12.2  87.8   
        
Women        
Unemployment 18.9    96.1  3.8 
Employment 37.9  44.7    55.3 
Inactivity 27.1  7.3  92.7   
        
  
Source: Prepared using the 2002 EPS. 
 
  134.  Results 
Table 4 and Table 5 present the estimation of the five models presented in section 2. Models 
in Table 4 consider all transitions from employment to inactivity, while models in Table 5 
consider only voluntary transitions. All these alternative models entail the inclusion of a  
random effect (frailty). In all the models, the variables included are those of employment 
history, years of schooling, and family structure. 
Whenever possible I include a measure capturing the presence of a partner. This is done 
through the use of two dummy variables. One dummy variable (Married-T) is defined as one 
if the woman had a partner and was still with him in 2002. The other dummy variable 
(Married-U) equals one if the woman had been married, but the relationship ended at some 
point in time, which is unknown. 
The employment history of the individual is reflected in the model by means of the time 
variable in equation (1), as well as through the variables that record the individual’s 
employment history prior to the beginning of each employment period. The employment 
history is characterized by years of experience, years of inactivity, and years of 
unemployment. Additionally, the model includes the unemployment rate, sourced from the 
University of Chile Survey
6, as a control variable. 
                                                           
6 A regional unemployment rate could not be used because a series of such rates for the period 1980 – 2002 
does not exist. 
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record the age structure of each woman’s children. In particular, I am interested in analyzing 
the transitions of women around childbirth and during the first years of the child. To this end, 
the variables “child less1 year” and “child 1 year old” are defined such that they flag both the 
first and second year of age of a given child. These variables are created because Chile is a 
country with very generous maternal benefits. Specifically, women have a 20-week (paid) 
maternity leave and they are allowed up to a year of paid parental leave if the child is sick. A 
woman might not have any incentives (or have the need) to leave work while she is using 
these benefits but might be tempted (or have) to do it once she has exhausted them. 
Hence, the interest lies in capturing the effect of the birth of a child on the employment status 
of the woman. These variables interact with the dichotomy variable, that divides the sample 
of women into four groups, each representing a different generation depending on the age of 
the individual in the year 2002. A priori, the birth of a child is expected to initiate different 
reactions, within the labor market, from each generation. At the same time the effect should 
be greater among women who self-report leaving their employment voluntarily. 
The results of the duration model should be carefully interpreted. A positive coefficient 
means that the variable has a positive effect on the risk of leaving employment, while a 
negative coefficient means that the variable reduce the probability of leaving employment. 
Positive coefficients lead to a hazard ratio greater than one, while negative coefficients lead 
to a hazard ratio less than one.  
  15Table 4:  
Estimated Results. All Transitions 
 
Model I: Base 
Model, without 
marital controls  Model II-M:  Model II-T  Model III 
Model IV (year 
dummies) 
  Coefficient Sig.  Coefficient Sig.  Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig.  Coefficient Sig. 
Child less 1 year - G 20-34  0.8328  ***  0.6578  ***  0.6847  ***  0.6856  ***  0.8253  *** 
Child less 1 year - G 35-44  1.0273  ***  0.7395  ***  0.7649  ***  0.8894  ***  1.0062  *** 
Child less 1 year - G 45-54  1.1627  ***  1.1662  ***  1.1521  ***  1.0664  ***  1.1727  *** 
Child less 1 year - G 54 and more  1.0148  **  0.7815    0.6798    0.9686  **  1.1185  ** 
Child 1 year - G 20-34  0.3496  ***  0.3205  *  0.3028  *  0.2103  *  0.3627  *** 
Child 1 year - G 35-44  0.3657  ***  0.2403    0.2339    0.2341  *  0.3251  ** 
Child 1 year - G 45-54  0.6067  ***  0.5610  *  0.4984  *  0.5243  **  0.6495  *** 
Child 1 year - G 54 and more  0.7984  *  0.3708    0.2828    0.7457  *  0.6843   
Child 2-3 years  0.1022  *  0.0831    0.0685    0.0158    0.1076  * 
Child 4-5 years  0.0349    -0.0267    -0.0227    -0.0300    0.0163   
Child 6-14 years  -0.0365    -0.0763  *  -0.0861  *  -0.0670  *  -0.0427   
G  35-44  -0.1357  0.0553  0.0465   -0.1034   -0.4425  *** 
G  45-54  0.1766   0.2720  0.2708    0.1957    -0.2027  
G 54 and more  1.0358  ***  1.0956  **  1.1884  ***  1.0917  ***  0.5665  * 
Years of schooling  -0.1650  ***  -0.1833  ***  -0.1739  ***  -0.1647  ***  -0.1613  *** 
Age -0.1673  ***  -0.1950  ***  -0.2020  ***  -0.1886  ***  -0.1555  *** 
Age Square  0.0014  ***  0.0017  ***  0.0018  ***  0.0017  ***  0.0013  *** 
Previous Experience LM (years)  -0.0096  ***  -0.0103  ***  -0.0120  ***  -0.0101  ***  -0.0087  *** 
Previous Experience LM Square  0.0001  ***  0.0001  ***  0.0001  ***  0.0001  ***  0.0001  *** 
Previous Inactivity (years)  0.1638  ***  0.1609  ***  0.1718  ***  0.1582  ***  0.1946  *** 
Previous Inactivity (years) square  -0.0015    -0.0009    -0.0014    -0.0016    -0.0010   
Previous Unemployment (years)  0.1072  **  0.1197  *  0.1040  *  0.1021  *  0.1474  *** 
Previous Unemployment square  -0.0008    -0.0019    -0.0004    -0.0008    -0.0009   
Unemployment Rate  -0.0438  ***  -0.0423  ***  -0.0445  ***  -0.0452  ***  -0.2261  *** 
Partner present  - relationship never 
ends     0.6091  ***  0.7521  ***  0.6939  ***     
Partner present  - relationship ends, 
exact date unknown.           0.1686  *     
Constant Model  -1.5893  ***  -1.5024  ***  -1.6203  ***  -1.6239  ***  2.0630  *** 
Source: Prepared using the 2002 EPS. 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01;*** p<0.001. 
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Estimated Results. Voluntary Transitions 
 
Model I: Base 
Model, without 
marital controls  Model II-M:  Model II-T  Model III 
Model IV (year 
dummies) 
  Coefficient Sig.  Coefficient Sig.  Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig.  Coefficient Sig. 
Child less 1 year - G 20-34  0.9840  ***  0.7977  ***  0.7436  ***  0.8340  ***  0.9962  *** 
Child less 1 year - G 35-44  1.1621  ***  1.0548  ***  1.0221  ***  1.0349  ***  1.1507  *** 
Child less 1 year - G 45-54  1.1536  ***  1.2470  ***  1.1603  ***  1.0642  ***  1.1539  *** 
Child less 1 year - G 54 and more  1.3056  **  0.9455    0.7756    1.2613  **  1.4330  ** 
Child 1 year - G 20-34  0.3850  **  0.3184    0.2652    0.2403    0.4164  ** 
Child 1 year - G 35-44  0.4044  **  0.3658  *  0.3144    0.2838    0.3652  * 
Child 1 year - G 45-54  0.3488    0.2984    0.1696    0.2743    0.3901   
Child 1 year - G 54 and more  1.3910  **  0.8133    0.6647    1.3413  **  1.4169  ** 
Child 2-3 years  -0.0590    -0.0920    -0.1418    -0.1396    -0.0414   
Child 4-5 years  -0.0950    -0.0743    -0.1189    -0.1610  *  -0.1000   
Child 6-14 years  -0.0756  *  -0.1626  **  -0.1852  ***  -0.1116  **  -0.0801  * 
G  35-44  0.0517   0.0451  0.0563    0.0853    -0.2598  
G 45-54  0.1803    -0.0324    0.0229    0.1959    -0.1688   
G 54 and more  0.7217  **  0.4032    0.5155    0.7755  **  0.3374   
Years of schooling  -0.0911  ***  -0.1100  ***  -0.0999  ***  -0.0930  ***  -0.0886  *** 
Age -0.1581  ***  -0.1600  ***  -0.1675  ***  -0.1799  ***  -0.1516  *** 
Age Square  0.0018  ***  0.0019  ***  0.0020  ***  0.0021  ***  0.0018  *** 
Previous Experience LM (years)  -0.0104  ***  -0.0115  ***  -0.0131  ***  -0.0108  ***  -0.0094  *** 
Previous Experience LM Square  0.0000  ***  0.0000  ***  0.0001  ***  0.0000  ***  0.0001  *** 
Previous Inactivity (years)  0.1200  ***  0.1088  ***  0.1017  ***  0.1145  ***  0.1525  *** 
Previous Inactivity (years) square  -0.0018    -0.0014    -0.0010    -0.0018    -0.0012   
Previous Unemployment (years)  -0.0143    0.0065    -0.0161    -0.0123    0.0352   
Previous Unemployment square  0.0045    0.0029    0.0042    0.0040    0.0040   
Unemployment Rate  -0.0528  ***  -0.0557  ***  -0.0575  ***  -0.0540  ***  -0.3262  *** 
Partner present  - relationship never 
ends     0.4432  ***  0.6891  ***  0.6334  ***     
Partner present  - relationship ends, 
exact date unknown.           0.1877  *     
Constant Model  -3.4070  ***  -3.1402  ***  -3.2707  ***  -3.3984  ***  2.0276  *** 
Source: Prepared using the 2002 EPS. 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01;*** p<0.001. 
 
 
From these tables it can be seen that having a child increases the risk of leaving employment. 
These effect increases as the generation gets older. The magnitude of the coefficient does not 
change under the different assumptions considered. It is true, however, that some coefficients 
loose significance when the sample is restricted, but this is due to the standard errors of the 
coefficients being higher in the restricted sample. 
  17Table 6 presents, for each estimated model, a summary of the hazard ratios of entering an 
inactivity period after the woman in each generation has given birth to a child, during his 
first and second year. The childbirth effect increases as the generations get older and the 
effect is even greater when only the voluntary transitions are considered. While the hazard of 
entering an inactivity period, for a woman of the 68-87 generation, increases by 130% during 
the year the child was born, the hazard, for a woman born before the year 1948, increases by 
176%. The effect on the voluntary transitions is even greater, 168% for the youngest 
generation versus 269% for the oldest generation. 
The estimated values for the parameters of the family structure variables do not differ 
substantially between the different models. The estimated coefficients are smaller in the 
restricted samples, but they are still large and significant. 
Even after one year of the birth of a child, women still face a high risk of leaving 
employment. A woman who is still working when her son reaches the age of one, still faces a 
50% higher risk of leaving employment. Something is making these mothers reconsider 
whether they should remain at work or not, provided that they are working during the child’s 
first year of age. This could be related to the generous maternal benefits the Chilean 
government offers during the first year of life of a child, as mothers are allowed up to a year 
of paid parental leave if the child is sick. 
The effect of having older children in the household is small or statistically insignificant. 
This is expected since what is being modeled is the probability of employed women entering 
an inactivity period. It is assumed that when the woman is employed and has school-aged 
children she has no reason to leave the job and enter an inactivity period. 
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Table 6: 
The Effect of the Birth of a Child on the Probability of Entering an Inactivity Period 
Age in year 2002  15-34   35-44   45-54    55 or more 
Year of Birth  1968-1987  1958-1967  1948-1957  Before 1948 
   All  Transitions 
Base Specification - Model I                 
  Less than one year old  2.30 ***  2.79 ***  3.20  ***  2.76 ** 
  1-2 years old  1.42 ***  1.44 ***  1.83  ***  2.22 * 
 Constant     0.87   1.19    2.82 *** 
Model II-M                 
  Less than one year old  1.93 ***  2.09 ***  3.21  ***  2.18  
  1-2 years old  1.38 *  1.27   1.75  *  1.45  
 Constant     1.06   1.31    2.99 ** 
Model II-T                 
  Less than one year old  1.98 ***  2.15 ***  3.16  ***  1.97  
  1-2 years old  1.35 *  1.26   1.65  *  1.33  
 Constant     1.05   1.31    3.28 *** 
Model III                 
  Less than one year old  1.98 ***  2.43 ***  2.90  ***  2.63 ** 
  1-2 years old  1.23 *  1.00 *  1.69  **  2.11 * 
 Constant     0.90   1.22    2.98 *** 
Model IV                 
  Less than one year old  2.28 ***  2.74 ***  3.23  ***  3.06 ** 
  1-2 years old  1.44 ***  1.38 **  1.91  ***  1.98  
 Constant     0.64 ***  0.82    1.76 * 
   Voluntary  Transitions 
Base Specification – Model I                 
  Less than one year old  2.68 ***  3.20 ***  3.17  ***  3.69 ** 
  1-2 years old  1.47 **  1.50 **  1.42    4.02 ** 
 Constant     1.05   1.20    2.06 ** 
Model II-M                 
  Less than one year old  2.22 ***  2.87 ***  3.48  ***  2.57  
  1-2 years old  1.37   1.44 *  1.35    2.26  
 Constant     1.05   0.97    1.50  
Model II-T                 
  Less than one year old  2.10 ***  2.78 ***  3.19  ***  2.17  
  1-2 years old  1.30   1.37   1.18    1.94  
 Constant     1.06   1.02    1.67  
Model III                 
  Less than one year old  2.30 ***  2.81 ***  2.90  ***  3.53 ** 
  1-2 years old  1.27   1.00   1.32    3.82 ** 
 Constant     1.09   1.22    2.17 ** 
Model IV                 
  Less than one year old  2.71 ***  3.16 ***  3.17  ***  4.19 ** 
  1-2 years old  1.52 **  1.44 *  1.48    4.12 ** 
 Constant     0.77   0.84    1.40  
Source: Prepared using the 2002 EPS.       Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01;*** p<0.001. 
  19The inclusion of the individual effect and the employment history variables in the model 
show the persistence of the contrasting patterns of female labor force participation. The 
greater the actual labor experience, the lower the probability is of entering an inactivity 
period. Additionally, the greater the number of years the woman has remained inactive in the 
past, the greater the probability is of re-entering an inactivity period (Graph 1). A woman 
who initiates employment after being inactive for 5 years, has a hazard of becoming inactive 
twice as much as that of a woman who has been continuously employed. 
The relative hazards predicted by each model differs, but qualitatively the effect is similar. In 
the particular case of the effect of years of past inactivity, the voluntary transitions model 
predicts a substantially smaller effect than the model that includes all transitions. This could 
be indicating that many of the women’s involuntary transitions to inactivity periods are 
particularly conditioned by the history of inactivity. There is a possibility that the market is 
penalizing the women in terms of salary earnings or in terms of employment opportunities. 
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  20There are two other variables that influence the probability of entering an inactivity period, 
even after controlling for having children and employment history. Both age and level of 
education, significantly influence the probability of retiring from the labor market. The 
model includes a quadratic polynomial of age in an effort to evaluate the possible existence 
of non-linearities (Graph 2). The base category is defined as the 15-year old individuals. 
There are no fertile cycle effects, since there are controls for the presence of children in the 
household and for employment history variables. The hazard of entering an inactivity
7 period 
decreases monotonically with age.  
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Source: Prepared using the 2002 EPS. 
 
 
The human capital variables also reveal a strong trend to remain in the labor market, as is 
predicted by the dynamic theories of labor supply. A woman holding a university education 
                                                           
7 I am intentionally leaving out the analysis transition. 
  21will enter an inactivity period with a substantially lower probability than a woman 
possessing an incomplete primary education (Graph 3).  
Graph 3: 
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5.  Conclusions 
There are studies that estimate the effect of the family structure on the female labor supply in 
Chile. The estimation of standard labor supply models utilizing cross-sectional databases 
have suggested that the presence of children in the household conditions the female labor 
force participation, while it only marginally affects the male labor force participation. In 
particular, these studies report that greater effects are produced at the level of participation. 
A crucial problem encountered when evaluating these results is that the family structure 
variables are definitely conditioned by the family model adopted, which in turn also 
  22conditions the female labor force participation. Considering these issues, the family structure 
variables are potentially endogenous. 
This paper explores the dynamics of female labor force participation in Chile using 
longitudinal data to evaluate how the birth of a child can affect the woman’s decision to 
work, including women strongly attached to the labor market. It is expected that an 
individual effect, which does not vary in time, will capture the effects of cultural factors 
playing a role on the woman’s attachment to the labor market and the effect of other non-
varying omitted variables. Furthermore, pre-labor experience variables control for the effect 
of the individual’s intrinsic (time varying) attachment to the labor market and ensure the 
consistent estimation of the effect of the family structure variables on the current 
employment status. 
The results indicate that the hazard of leaving employment is high for women during the first 
year of their newborn child. The mother of a newborn child is twice as likely to leave 
employment. The effect of newborns on employment transitions is even greater among older 
generations and among voluntary quitters. Even after one year of the birth of a child, women 
still faces a high risk of leaving employment. A woman who is still working when her son 
reaches the age of one, still face a 50% higher risk of leaving employment. Something is 
making these mothers reconsider whether they should remain at work, provided that they are 
working during the child’s first year of age. This could be related to the existence of 
maternal benefits in Chile, where women have a 20-week (paid) maternity leave and they are 
allowed up to a year of paid parental leave if the child is sick. A woman might not have any 
  23incentives (or have the need) to leave work while she is using these benefits but might be 
tempted (or have) to do it once she has exhausted them. 
The persistence of the contrasting labor force patterns among women are confirmed when 
the individual effect and the employment history variables are considered in the model. As 
the actual labor experience increases, the probability of entering an inactivity period 
decreases. Additionally, the greater the number of years a woman remained inactive in the 
past, the greater the probability is of re-entering an inactivity period. In the voluntary 
transitions model, the presence of inactivity periods in the past is less frequent than in the 
model that includes all transitions. This can be seen as a possible indication of an important 
penalization by the labor market, in terms of employment opportunities. 
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